Fertilizer subsidy programs have re-emerged as popular policy tools in sub-Saharan Africa. Despite a burgeoning body of literature on program impacts, the political economy of the programs remains poorly understood. In particular, there is a dearth of empirical evidence to support or refute the conventional wisdoms that governments systematically target subsidized inputs to certain areas based on past voting patterns and that fertilizer subsidies win votes. This article discusses the theoretical links between government targeting of subsidized fertilizer and voter behavior, then uses panel data from Zambia to empirically test these conventional wisdoms. Results suggest that Zambia's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy governments targeted more subsidized fertilizer to households in areas where it had strong support in the previous presidential election. However, contrary to conventional wisdom, marginal changes in the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program had no statistically significant effect on the share or number of votes won by incumbent presidents.
"But there is no doubt that this Farmer Input Support Programme, which is supposed to be an economic activity, has sadly been abused or mismanaged by politicians and those seeking patronage and turned into a political tool for their election campaigns. . . And in this election year things will be worse -it will be nothing but a campaign tool; fertiliser bought with taxpayers' money will be exchanged for votes." -Editorial from The Post, Zambia, March 13, 2011. Do agricultural input subsidy programs win votes? Do past voting patterns affect government targeting of subsidized inputs? The "new" wave of agricultural input subsidy programs (ISPs) that has been sweeping sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) since the mid 2000s has received a great deal of attention from agricultural economists and other researchers (see, among many others, Morris et al. 2007; Xu et al. 2009; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Chirwa 2011; Chibwana, Fisher, and Shively 2012; Holden and Lunduka 2012a, 2012b; Ricker-Gilbert, Jayne, and Shively 2013; Jayne and Rashid 2013 ). Yet to date, the political economy of the programs in general and the links between the programs and voting behavior in particular remain poorly understood.
Understanding these links is important because in addition to their stated objectives (e.g., increasing access to inorganic fertilizer or improved seed, and improving agricultural productivity, incomes, and food security), many of the programs appear to also have significant political objectives (Morris et al. 2007; Jayne and Rashid 2013) . Moreover, the conventional wisdom in the region is that ISPs are an effective way to garner and maintain rural votes, and the literature on political clientelism and vote buying has tended to assume that these actions are effective in shaping voter choice (Wantchekon 2003; Stokes 2007) . There is little rigorous empirical evidence to support these assumptions.
1 One objective of this article is to test these assumptions empirically.
Another common perception is that African governments may favor certain areas based on past voting behavior when distributing subsidized inputs-for example, core supporter areas where they received a large share of votes, or swing areas where the election was hotly contested. While there is some empirical evidence to support this claim (Banful 2011; Dionne and Horowitz 2013; Mason and RickerGilbert 2013) , of these only Banful (2011) and Dionne and Horowitz (2013) explore this issue in detail.
2 A second objective of this article is to bring additional empirical evidence to bear on this debate. If subsidized inputs are targeted based on political considerations rather than, for example, beneficiaries' inability to afford the inputs at unsubsidized prices or the expected profitability of the subsidized inputs, then the ISP's capacity to achieve its stated objectives could be undermined (Pan and Christiaensen 2012) .
To achieve these objectives, the article uses panel data from Zambia to answer two main research questions. First, is there empirical evidence of politically motivated targeting of subsidized fertilizer under Zambia's Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) governments, the party in power from 1991, when multiparty elections resumed, until 2011? In particular, were core supporter, swing, or opposition areas favored, ceteris paribus? And second, did this targeting strategy pay off for the MMD at the voting booth; that is, did the MMD win more votes in areas that received more subsidized fertilizer, ceteris paribus? Zambia is a highly relevant case study because the government devotes a significant share of its agricultural sector expenditures to ISPs (e.g., an average of 32% per year between 2004 and 2013 [Mason, Jayne, and Mofya-Mukuka 2013] ). Like many other ISPs in SSA, Zambia's ISP is targeted (as opposed to universal): subsidized inputs are only available to beneficiaries approved and selected by government authorities. Moreover, Zambia has been a relatively stable electoral democracy since 1991, with regular free and fair elections. Zambia's experience can thus provide important insights about the ways in which ISPs in developing countries may affect voting behavior and vice versa.
The article makes two main contributions. First, it produces rigorous empirical evidence on the relationships between ISPs and voting patterns in SSA, complementing previous work by Banful (2011) for Ghana and Dionne and Horowitz (2013) for Malawi. A key difference between this article and these earlier studies, however, is our use of panel data methods such as the fixed effects (FE) estimator and the correlated random effects (CRE) approach to control for time invariant unobserved factors that could be correlated with both subsidized fertilizer targeting and voting patterns.
3 This should improve the consistency of our econometric estimates.
Another key difference between this article and Dionne and Horowitz (2013) is that we use official election results at the constituency or district level when studying the targeting of subsidized fertilizer, whereas Dionne and Horowitz (2013) use individual-level data on partisan leanings and receipt of subsidized fertilizer. While Dionne And Horowitz's approach offers some useful insights, our use of more aggregate voting patterns (similar to Mason and Ricker-Gilbert [2013] ) likely better 1 Several descriptive studies suggest that Malawi's ISP was instrumental in President Bingu wa Mutharika's landslide victory in 2009 (Smiddy and Young 2009; Chinsinga 2010 Chinsinga , 2012 Ferree and Horowitz 2010; Mpesi and Muriaas 2012) but only Dionne and Horowitz (2013) and Brazys, Heaney, and Walsh (2015) attempt to control for potential confounding factors. 2 The other articles focus on the effects of ISPs on demand for commercial fertilizer or improved seed. Past election results are used as instruments for subsidized inputs but the politicization of ISPs is not explored in detail.
reflects how targeting subsidized fertilizer is done in practice. Particularly in the Zambian context of free and fair elections and secret ballots, government authorities would generally not know how a given individual voted but they would be able to observe more aggregate voting patterns.
The second contribution of the article is that it provides a useful application of a fractional response model combined with CRE and control function (CF) approaches. Such models allow the researcher to control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity and correct for endogeneity when the dependent variable is a proportion (e.g., the share of votes won by a political party) and the researcher has panel data and a valid instrumental variable (Papke and Wooldridge 2008) . While proportion-dependent variables are not uncommon in applied economics, fractional response models are rarely used, and even less so when combined with CRE and CF approaches. 4 Unlike linear models, fractional response models respect the bounded nature of proportion-dependent variables and allow for non-constant marginal effects in a manner akin to probit and logit models for binary dependent variables.
We find that under Zambia's MMD governments, the targeting of subsidized fertilizer favored areas where the MMD had strong support in the previous presidential election. However, marginal changes in the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program had no statistically significant effect on the share or number of votes won by the MMD (the incumbent party) in the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We first present a conceptual framework of politician and voter behavior vis-avis transfers such as subsidized fertilizer, and state the hypotheses to be tested. We then describe the Zambian context with a focus on the fertilizer subsidy programs that were in place and the elections that were held during the study period. Next, we outline the data and empirical strategy used to test our hypotheses, present the results, and conclude with a discussion of implications for research and policy.
Conceptual Framework
Which voter group-core supporter, swing, or opposition-will politicians favor in their targeting of subsidized fertilizer or other discretionary transfers? The seminal theoretical models of redistributive politics vary in their assumptions and hence in their predictions. Some predict that more transfers will be targeted to core supporter groups (Cox and McCubbins 1986; and Nichter 2008) but others predict that more will be targeted to swing groups (Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; and Stokes 2005) . 5 In related work, Dixit and Londregan's (1996) model nests the Cox and McCubbins/core supporter and Lindbeck and Weibull/swing voter models as special cases. None of the seminal models predicts that opposition groups will be favored. We outline the key assumptions underlying these models' predictions, and assess which are most likely to hold in the Zambian context. A politician's optimization problem is generally to choose the transfer-targeting strategy (i.e., the level of transfers to allocate to each group) that maximizes his/her expected number or share of votes subject to a budget constraint (i.e., total spending on the transfers cannot exceed an exogenously given amount). Voters are assumed to vote for the candidate that maximizes his/her expected utility. Voters have intrinsic preferences for different political parties or candidates (e.g., ideological or ethnic affinities) but also gain utility from consumption (C), which can be augmented by transfers received from politicians. Voters are potentially willing to vote against their intrinsic preferences if the additional utility received from a transfer exceeds the disutility of voting against these preferences. Voters' utility functions are assumed to be increasing and concave in C such that there is diminishing marginal utility of consumption. The earlier models (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Lindbeck and Weibull 1987; and Dixit and Londregan 1996) conceive of the politician-voter interaction as a one-off game, whereas the later models (Stokes 2005; Nichter 2008 ) consider it an infinitely repeated game.
The key assumptions underlying Cox and McCubbins' (1986) core supporter prediction are that politicians are risk averse and that the "electoral rate of return" of transfers (the expected increase in votes from a given group given a one-unit increase in transfers to that group) is riskier for swing groups than for core supporter groups. The intuition is that politicians are closer to their core supporters and better understand their needs and how they will respond to transfers; swing groups are lesser known commodities and hence "riskier investments" (Cox and McCubbins 1986) . In the Dixit and Londregan (1996) version of the model, core supporter groups are favored when political parties can more efficiently deliver transfers to their core supporters than to the other party's core supporters. When parties are equally efficient at delivering transfers to these groups, Dixit and Londregan predict that swing groups will be favored, as in Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) . A priori, we might expect an incumbent party such as the MMD to be more efficient at delivering transfers (including subsidized fertilizer) to its supporters and for it to have more information about the electoral rate of return of supporter groups. Risk aversion on the part of the MMD is also a reasonable assumption given its status as the incumbent party during the period of analysis; per Cox and McCubbins (1986) , targeting more transfers to core supporter groups is the optimal strategy for maintaining the stability of political coalitions over time.
Turning to the later models, Stokes' (2005) finding that politicians' optimal strategy is to target more transfers to swing groups hinges on the assumptions that politicians can at least imperfectly monitor voters' choices, and that no potential voters abstain from voting. However, Nichter (2008) shows that if voters can abstain, and if politicians are unable to monitor voters' choices but can monitor whether they have voted, then politicians' optimal strategy is to favor core supporters. In particular, unmobilized but strong supporters should be targeted in an effort to increase turnout among supporters. In Zambia, voting is done via secret ballot and is not compulsory (e.g. Thus, the Nichter assumptions (that potential voters might abstain and politicians can monitor turnout but not actual vote choices) are more plausible there than the Stokes assumptions (that all potential voters vote and politicians can monitor vote choices).
Overall, during the MMD's incumbency in Zambia, the core supporter model assumptions (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Nichter 2008) better fit the context than the swing voter model assumptions. Previous studies have mainly relied on aggregate data from past elections to test these competing models (e.g., Schady 2000; Dahlberg and Johannson 2002; Banful 2011) . We do the same since we, like Zambian politicians, cannot observe individual vote choices.
Our first hypothesis to be tested is: HYPOTHESIS 1. The MMD government favored core supporter areas in its targeting of subsidized fertilizer.
A government could favor an area (e.g., a constituency or district) through the coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program (i.e., by including a greater share of households in the area in the program) and/or through the scale of the program (i.e., by providing a larger quantity of subsidized fertilizer to program beneficiaries in the area). As described further in subsequent sections, we follow previous studies (Banful 2011) and test this hypothesis by regressing measures of the coverage or scale of the fertilizer subsidy program on variables capturing the extent to which a constituency or district supported the MMD and the closeness of the race in the last presidential election. (There were 150 constituencies, 72 districts, and nine provinces in Zambia during the period of analysis.) Constituencies/districts that were more hotly contested represent swing constituencies/districts.
Returning to theoretical considerations, while the models of redistributive politics above provide some insights on voter behavior vis-a-vis transfers such as subsidized fertilizer, various theories of voting behavior offer additional insights on why such transfers might affect voters' choices. Among other factors, voters are thought to base their choices on retrospective (backward looking) and/or prospective (forward looking) assessments of government performance, and these assessments may be egotropic (based on one's own experience) and/or sociotropic (based on perceptions of collective experience) (Fiorina 1981; Kiewiet 1983; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2008 ). An emerging body of literature has found strong survey evidence that African voter choices, including Zambians', are influenced by such assessments (Posner and Simon 2002; Youde 2005; Bratton, Bhavani, and Chen 2012) . Voters that have received transfers from a government program may reward an incumbent party based on a retrospective, egotropic assessment. Even if a voter did not directly participate in the transfer program, if s/he views the program as having been beneficial for her/his geographic area or more broadly (a retrospective, sociotropic assessment), it could favorably affect her/his vote for the incumbent. On the prospective side, voters may use past receipt of transfers (individually or collectively) to form expectations about future receipt thereof (Calvo and Murillo 2013) ; if they or their geographic area have been favored by the incumbent party with transfers in the past, they might expect the same in the future and support the incumbent (Drazen and Eslava 2006) . Moreover, as argued by DiazCayeros, Estévez, and Magaloni (2016) , voters may reward incumbent governments for transfers "because they need to signal loyalty to the party in order to obtain similar benefits in the future." Our analysis of the effects of subsidized fertilizer transfers on voting behavior is based on district-level data, and our second hypothesis to be tested is as follows: HYPOTHESIS 2. In presidential elections, electoral support for the MMD (the incumbent party) is increasing in the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program in the district. Under the FSP, beneficiary farmers were to receive 400 kg of fertilizer and 20 kg of hybrid maize seed. In practice, the quantities of subsidized inputs received varied widely across beneficiary households ; this is also the case in the data used in this article. The government's stated targeting criteria required FSP beneficiaries to: (a) be members of a cooperative or other farmer organization; (b) be actively involved in farming in the cooperative's coverage area but be cultivating less than five ha total; (c) have the capacity to grow at least one ha of maize; (d) be able to pay the farmer share of the input costs; (e) not be concurrently benefiting from the Food Security Pack, a small input grant program targeted at "vulnerable but viable" households cultivating less than one ha ( (table 1) . The move proved insufficient to secure a victory, and Sata defeated Banda by nearly seven percentage points. This ended twenty years of MMD rule in Zambia. Sata maintained the scale of FISP in the 900,000 intended beneficiaries range from 2011/12 through 2013/14, then expanded it to 1,000,000 in 2014/15. Sata died in office in October 2014, and Edgar Lungu (PF) was elected as his successor in January 2015. The government's stated targeting criteria for FISP were similar to FSP with some variation from year to year in the area of maize that beneficiaries were to have the capacity to cultivate. In 2010/11, the main FISP year analyzed here, this requirement was pegged at 0.5 ha; district-level targeting criteria remained unstated (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 2010).
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Data
We draw on numerous data sources to test our hypotheses. Official results for the 1996 to 2011 presidential elections are from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (1996 Zambia ( , 2002 Zambia ( , 2006a Zambia ( , 2008 Zambia ( , 2011a . The most disaggregated level at which these data are available is the constituency level; these data can be aggregated to the district or higher levels.
We test hypothesis 1, that the MMD favored core supporter areas in its targeting of subsidized fertilizer, by using these election data in conjunction with two separate nationally-representative survey data sets of smallholder farm households that capture participation in government fertilizer subsidy programs and other socioeconomic information: ( (table 2) . 7, 8 The SS data indicate the constituency in which each randomly sampled household resides; we can thus match the nationally-representative household survey data with the constituencylevel election results from the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ). This enables us to test whether households in core supporter constituencies had a higher probability of receiving subsidized fertilizer or received larger quantities on average. Although the SS data are nationally representative of smallholder households in Zambia, these data are not constituency or district representative in the sense that the data should not be weighted and used to compute constituency-or districtlevel receipt of subsidized fertilizer. This precludes a constituency-or district-level analysis of targeting with the SS data.
In fact there are no data available for Zambia that are both representative at the constituency level and that capture information on fertilizer subsidy programs. (This also prevents us from testing hypothesis 2 at the constituency level.) However, the 2010/ 11 CFS is representative at the district level and captures information on the subsidies; 7 There are 4,286 smallholder households (i.e., households cultivating less than 20 ha) in the SS balanced panel. See the supplementary online appendix for further information on these data including attrition over time. We fail to reject the null hypothesis of no attrition bias using the regression-based test described in Wooldridge (2010) . Throughout the article, we use the 10% level as our cutoff for statistical significance unless otherwise specified. this is our second source of household survey data for testing hypothesis 1. We aggregate information on the receipt of subsidized fertilizer and other socioeconomic information to the district level, combine it with districtlevel election results for 2008, and test whether core supporter, swing, or opposition districts were favored in the FISP subsidy program. We also test for politicized targeting of official district-level allocations of FISP fertilizer, data for which are from the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (2002, 2006, 2010) . Both the SS-and CFS-based tests of hypothesis 1 are useful because the politicization of targeting may occur at the district and/ or sub-district (e.g., constituency) levels. The final data source used in our testing of hypothesis 1 is district-level dekadal (10-day period) rainfall data starting in 1990 from the Zambia Meteorological Department. These data are used to construct variables for average rainfall conditions in the district in the nine agricultural years prior to each agricultural year covered by the SS and CFS data; the rainfall variables are then merged with the survey data.
We test hypothesis 2, that electoral support for the MMD in a given district was increasing in the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program in that district, using ECZ data on the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections (ECZ 2006a (ECZ , 2011a 9 The data sources for other control variables included in the models to test hypothesis 2 are summarized in table A.1 in appendix A. The rationale for the various control variables is discussed below.
Empirical Strategy
This section describes the empirical approach used to test hypotheses 1 and 2. Data constraints prevent us from using the same econometric model (e.g., a system of equations) to test these hypotheses. A critical part of our identification strategy and a contribution of the article relative to previous studies is the use of panel data methods to control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity that might otherwise bias our results. While data are available to construct a district-level panel data set to test hypothesis 2 for the 2006 and 2011 election years, data are not available to construct a district-level panel data set with the necessary control variables to reliably test hypothesis 1 in the corresponding subsidized fertilizer program years. We therefore use separate models and data sets to test the two hypotheses.
Testing Hypothesis 1
We first describe the empirical approach employed with the SS household panel survey data, then turn to the approach taken with the 2010/11 CFS district-level cross-sectional data. Our main empirical specification for the SS-based analysis is an unobserved effects probit model (Wooldridge 2010) in which the dependent variable, subferthh i;t , is equal to one if household i received subsidized fertilizer from the MMD's subsidy program in agricultural year t, and equal to zero otherwise: (1), e 1 indexes the election year (with e 1 < t) and k indexes the constituency. Further, P(.) indicates probability, Uð:Þ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, elect k;e 1 is a vector of variables summarizing the results of the last (most recent) presidential election in the household's constituency, z 1i;t is a vector of other control variables that may influence government targeting of subsidized fertilizer, l 1t are year fixed effects, c 1i is time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, and the a's are parameters to be estimated.
Similar to Schady (2000) , Dahlberg and Johannson (2002) , and Banful (2011), we use several specifications of elect k;e 1 to test hypothesis 1, which in this model is that on average and ceteris paribus, households in core supporter constituencies had a higher probability of being targeted by the MMD's fertilizer subsidy programs than households in swing or opposition constituencies. In specification (a), elect k;e 1 is the percentage of votes won by the MMD in the household's constituency in the last presidential election. If the MMD favored core supporter constituencies, then we would expect this variable to have a positive and statistically significant average partial effect (APE) on a household's probability of being targeted by the fertilizer subsidy program. In specification (b), elect k;e 1 is a binary variable equal to one if the MMD won the household's constituency in the last presidential election, and equal to zero otherwise. Let dMMD k;e 1 denote this variable. As in specification (a), a positive and significant APE for dMMD k;e 1 would be consistent with hypothesis 1. In specification (c), elect k;e 1 is the absolute value of the percentage point margin between the share of votes won by the MMD and the share of votes won by the lead opposition in the household's constituency in the last election. Let margin k;e 1 denote this variable. If the MMD favored swing constituencies, then we would expect margin k;e 1 to have a negative and significant APE, indicating that households in areas where the race was closer had a higher probability of being targeted by the subsidy program. And in specification (d), elect k;e 1 includes dMMD k;e 1 , margin k;e 1 , and their interaction, dMMD k;e 1 Â margin k;e 1 . If the APE of dMMD k;e 1 were positive, significant, and increasing in margin k;e 1 (i.e., the APE of the interaction effect were positive), it would imply that core supporter constituencies were favored, as in hypothesis 1. (See table A.2 in appendix A for summary statistics for these and other variables used in the SS-based test of hypothesis 1.) The last elections corresponding to the subsidized fertilizer program agricultural years in the SS are those held in 1996, 2001, and 2006; however, our main conclusions are robust to instead using the 2001 election as the "last" election prior to the 2006/07 agricultural year.
10
Given the FCP and FSP official eligibility requirements related to the ability to cultivate a given area of maize, to make the requisite contributions for the inputs, and to be a member of a cooperative or other farmer group, we include in z i;t the household's landholding size, the real value of its non-land productive assets (farm equipment and livestock), and a binary variable equal to one if any household member belonged to a cooperative or other farmer group as of the first survey wave.
11 The government may also target more subsidized fertilizer to a given area based on its suitability for maize production. We therefore control for agro-ecological region, nine-year moving average growing season rainfall and moisture stress in the household's district (see table A.2 for details), and a binary variable equal to one if the household's standard enumeration area (SEA) is agro-ecologically suitable for rainfed, low input management maize production. (An SEA, the most disaggregated geographic unit in the SS, includes 150-200 households or roughly two to four villages.) Additional controls include household demographic characteristics (the number of full-time-equivalent household members in various age groups, and the age, education, and sex of the household head); and SEAlevel variables on distance to the nearest district town, tarred/main road, and feeder road. Year dummies are included in the model to control for year fixed effects.
Equation (1) is estimated via CRE probit to control for c li . The CRE approach (Mundlak 1978; Chamberlain 1984) assumes that the unobserved heterogeneity is a function of the household-level time averages of the observed explanatory variables (call these
Under these assumptions and strict exogeneity of the explanatory variables conditional on c li , then we can control for c li in a probit model by 10 In addition, we tested for year-specific effects of elect k;e1 (e.g., to allow for differential effects based on the years since the last election or to allow for differential effects under FCP vs. FSP); however, the year-specific effects were either not statistically different from zero or not robust across model specifications or estimators.
11 Data on cooperative/farmer group membership were not collected in the second or third waves of the panel. However, using initial membership is likely preferable because anecdotal evidence suggests that since the initiation of FSP in 2002/03, most cooperatives/farmer groups were set up for the sole purpose of accessing FSP and thus are likely endogenous to FSP. The other official eligibility criteria were not having defaulted from the FCP and not concurrently benefiting from the Food Security Pack Program. Data on FCP default are not available, and the results are robust to explicitly controlling for Food Security Pack receipt.
including Wooldridge [2010] for a detailed discussion of CRE probit.) Note that like the FE estimator, the CRE approach allows c li and the observed covariates to be correlated.
All explanatory variables in our model are assumed to be strictly exogenous. This is a reasonable assumption because the variables are pre-determined when subsidized fertilizer is allocated to the household and/or the variables are at a level of aggregation far above the household level. Strict exogeneity is also a reasonable assumption for our key explanatory variables of interest, elect k;e 1 , particularly after controlling for the observed covariates and time-invariant heterogeneity. Moreover, these variables are the outcomes of the decisions of tens of thousands of voters in the constituency, and so are well beyond the control of an individual household. Finally, as we will demonstrate below, we find no evidence of feedback from current subsidized fertilizer allocations to future election outcomes, further supporting the exogeneity of elect k;e 1 .
In addition to the CRE probit estimates, we also report FE estimates for factors affecting the probability of receiving subsidized fertilizer, and FE and CRE Tobit estimates for factors affecting the kg of subsidized fertilizer received. As mentioned above, there is considerable variation in the quantity of subsidized fertilizer received among beneficiary households, and the MMD may have favored households in swing or core supporter constituencies by involving more of them in the program and/or by allocating them larger quantities of subsidized fertilizer.
For the 2010/11 CFS-based district-level analysis of FISP targeting, we use variables similar to elect k;e 1 but define them at the district level. Three dependent variables capturing the district-level scale or coverage of FISP are analyzed: the proportion of smallholder households receiving FISP fertilizer (associated regressions are estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS) and fractional response probit), the mean kg of FISP fertilizer received by smallholder households (OLS), and the administrative allocation of FISP fertilizer (OLS). On average, 27% of the smallholder households in a district received FISP fertilizer in 2010/11. The additional controls included in these models are listed in table A.3 in appendix A, as are summary statistics for all variables. The CFS collects less socioeconomic information than the SS, so a less rich set of controls is included in these models. Moreover, the CFS 2010/11 data are cross-sectional, so we cannot control for time-constant unobserved heterogeneity; associated results should therefore be interpreted as correlations.
Testing Hypothesis 2
To test hypothesis 2, our main empirical specification is an unobserved effects fractional response probit model (Papke and Wooldridge 2008) The other explanatory variables in equation (2) are intended to control for other potential drivers of voting behavior in Zambia; FRA d;tÀ1 is the MT of maize purchased by the FRA in the district in the maize marketing year prior to the election. 13 Recall that the FRA is Zambia's maize marketing board/ strategic grain reserve; it buys maize from smallholders at a pan-territorial price that typically exceeds the market price in major maize-producing areas. Maize purchases by the FRA are another form of transfer from the Zambian government to smallholder households, and thus may affect voting patterns for reasons similar to those hypothesized for fertilizer subsidy programs. Voting based on other economic conditions could also shape voting patterns (e.g., Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Posner and Simon 2002; Bratton, Bhavani, and Chen 2012) .Therefore, econ d;t includes the district-level labor force, unemployment rate, poverty rate, and Gini coefficient of income. In addition, ethnic voting is common in the region and it is important to control for demographic characteristics when modeling voting patterns (Bratton, Bhavani, and Chen 2012; Cerda and Vergara 2008; Mpesi and Muriaas 2012) . Therefore, v d;t includes the district-level number of registered voters and the percentage that is female, and the total district population, the percentage that is rural, and the percentage in various age groups. Also included are province dummies to capture, inter alia, differences in the dominant ethnic group in each province, a year dummy to control for the year fixed effect (l 2t ), and province Â year dummy interactions to control for time-varying provincial-level effects.
14 See table A.4 in appendix A for summary statistics for all variables in equation (2).
As in our empirical test of hypothesis 1 using the SS panel data, here again we control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (c 2d ) using the CRE approach. The CRE fractional response models are estimated via pooled probit quasi-maximum likelihood following Papke and Wooldridge (1996, 2008) . As discussed above, the CRE approach requires strict exogeneity of the regressors conditional on the unobserved heterogeneity. This is a reasonable assumption for most of the explanatory variables; they are all predetermined as of election time, and we would not expect unobserved shocks to voting patterns to affect urbanization, the age structure of the population, etc. However, previous studies and results presented below suggest that past election outcomes do affect subsequent targeting of subsidized fertilizer. Such feedback from current values of sMMD d;t to future values of subfert d;tÀ1 would violate strict exogeneity. Similarly, current election outcomes could affect future patterns of FRA purchases. Given these concerns, we test and correct for the potential endogeneity of subsidized fertilizer and FRA purchases using the control function (CF) approach as described in Papke and Wooldridge (2008) .
The CF approach entails estimating reduced form CRE pooled ordinary least squares (POLS) regressions in which the dependent variables are the suspected endogenous explanatory variables (SEEVs-subsidized fertilizer and FRA purchases) and the explanatory variables are all of the exogenous regressors in equation (2) plus at least one instrumental variable (IV) per SEEV. The reduced form CF residuals are then included as additional regressors in the structural model, equation (2). A t-test of the residuals tests the null hypothesis that the SEEV is exogenous against the alternative hypothesis that it is endogenous.
To be valid, an IV must be strongly partially correlated with the SEEV and be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error in the structural model. 15 For the subsidized fertilizer SEEV, our IV is the percentage of smallholder households in the district with landholdings of at least one hectare in 2002/ 03. For the FRA SEEV, our IV is a binary variable equal to one if the district falls predominately in agro-ecological region (AER) IIa, and equal to zero otherwise. 16 The reduced form CRE-POLS results suggest that these IVs are significantly and positively partially correlated with the SEEVs (table 3) . On average, districts where more smallholders had at least 1 ha of land in 2002/03 received significantly more subsidized fertilizer, and the FRA bought more maize from districts in AER IIa. The joint F-statistic for the excluded instruments exceeds 10 for the FRA and administrative allocation of subsidized fertilizer reduced forms, suggesting that the instruments are strong. 17 14 Our key findings are robust to controlling for the provincial-level percentages of the population in each of Zambia's broad ethnic groups in lieu of the province dummies. District-level ethnicity data are not available. 15 This error is implicit in equation (2) because the model is written in expected value form (Papke and Wooldridge 2008) . 16 There are four AERs in Zambia: AER I has low rainfall (less than 800 mm per year); AER IIa has moderate rainfall (800-1,000 mm) and clay soils; AER IIb has moderate rainfall and sandy soils; AER III has high rainfall (more than 1,000 mm). 17 The IVs are weaker for the other two subsidized fertilizer SEEVs, but if we instead use provincial-level econ variables, the IVs are stronger and we still fail to reject the exogeneity of subsidized fertilizer and FRA purchases.
Our arguments for the exogeneity of these IVs are as follows: 2002/03 is several years before the first election used in the analysis (2006); the percentage of smallholder households in the district with landholdings of at least one hectare in 2002/03 is thus related to the initial land endowment of smallholders in the district. Given the eligibility requirement that FSP recipients be able to cultivate at least one hectare of maize, it makes sense that this variable has a positive effect on subfert d;tÀ1 . However, given the other controls in the model (especially poverty and income inequality), as well as our ability to control for time invariant unobserved heterogeneity via CRE, this IV should be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error in the structural model.
Regarding the IV for FRA purchases, AER IIa is particularly conducive to maize production, and so it makes sense that FRA buys more maize from districts in this AER. But the AER in which a district falls is exogenous (as it is based on rainfall and soil type), and should be uncorrelated with the idiosyncratic error in the structural model, especially given that we also include province dummies and control for time constant unobserved district characteristics via CRE.
To provide further evidence that our two IVs are exogenous and validly excluded from equation (2), we over-identify the model with an additional (but weaker and ultimately unused) candidate IV, the percentage of smallholder households in the district that cultivated two or more hectares of land in year t-2, and then test the over-identifying restriction. (Such tests are more, not less, likely to reject over-identifying restrictions when instruments are weak [Murray 2011 ].) We fail to reject the over-identifying restriction in all cases, which supports the validity of our IVs.
Ultimately, we fail to reject the null hypotheses that the SEEVs are exogenous, as the CF residuals are not statistically significant in equation (2) for any specification (see table S.1 in the supplementary online appendix). The p-values for the individual CF residuals are all greater than 0.70, and p-values for tests of joint significance of the two CF residuals are all greater than 0.92. We therefore exclude the CF residuals from the final estimation form of equation (2).
Results
What do the empirical results suggest about hypothesis 1-that the MMD favored core supporter constituencies or districts in its targeting of subsidized fertilizer? Both the SS-and CFSbased results generally support this hypothesis. These results are summarized in tables 4 and 5, respectively, and selected full regression results are available in tables S.2 and S.3 in the supplementary online appendix.
The SS-based results suggest that smallholder households in core supporter constituencies, that is, constituencies where the MMD did well in the last presidential election, had a higher probability of receiving subsidized fertilizer and received a larger quantity of subsidized fertilizer, on average, and other factors being constant. 18 The percentage of votes won by the MMD and the binary variable for whether the MMD won the constituency have positive and statistically significant APEs on the subsidized fertilizer outcome variables in all relevant specifications in table 4 regardless of the estimator used. Moreover, there is a positive interaction effect between the MMD having won the constituency and the vote margin in the constituency, indicating that the effect of the MMD winning is increasing in the MMD's margin of victory. For example, the CRE probit results (column iv, panel B) suggest that smallholder households in constituencies won by the MMD in the last presidential election had a 3.85 percentage point greater probability of receiving subsidized fertilizer, and that the MMD won-effect increased by an average of 0.15 percentage points given a one percentage point increase in the MMD's margin of victory. Similarly, the CRE Tobit results (column iv, panel D) suggest that these households received 16.6 kg more subsidized fertilizer, on average, than households in constituencies lost by the MMD in the last election, and that the MMD won-effect increased by an average of 0.6 kg given a one percentage point increase in the MMD's margin of victory. These effects are significant in magnitude relative to the unconditional probability of receiving subsidized fertilizer (8.8%) and the mean quantity received (29. (table  5) , the estimates are less precisely measured but still suggest a positive and significant correlation between the MMD having won the district in the last election and the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program in that district (columns ii and iv). These APEs are substantial in magnitude relative to the average district-level proportion of smallholder households receiving subsidized fertilizer in 2010/11 (0.27), the average districtlevel mean quantity received by smallholder households (70.4 kg), and the average districtlevel administrative allocation (2,446 MT). In addition, there is weak evidence that an increase in the percentage of votes won by the MMD in the last election is correlated with 18 Though not reported here due to space constraints, empirical tests of hypothesis 1 using another nationally representative data set (the 2012 Rural Agricultural Livelihoods Survey (IAPRI, CSO, and MAL 2012)) lead to the same conclusion. 8,839 Zambian smallholder households were interviewed for this survey. See Mason, Jayne, and Mofya-Mukuka (2013). increases in the subsidy program (column i, p < 0.15 in three of four cases), but we find no evidence of significant interaction effects between the MMD having won the district and the vote margin (column iv). Interestingly, the effect of the MMD having won the district is weakest in statistical significance and relative magnitude when we use the administrative allocation of subsidized fertilizer to the district (panel D in table 5, columns ii and iv). While we can only speculate, this relative lack of politicized targeting in administrative allocations to districts may be because these allocations are publicly available in the FSP/FISP implementation manuals that are published annually by the Ministry of Agriculture ( MACO 2002 MACO -2010 . Although the process for allocating subsidized fertilizer to districts is opaque, the resultant intended quantities allocated are transparent. This is in stark contrast to the opacity of subsidized fertilizer distribution within districts, where there seems to be greater politicization (per table 4 and panels A-C in table 5). Within-district allocations (e.g., to constituencies) are not published. We return to this point in the concluding section. Neither set of results (SS-or CFS-based) provides robust evidence that the MMD favored swing constituencies or districts in its targeting of subsidized fertilizer. Recall that if this were the case, then we would expect the vote margin to have a negative and statistically significant APE on subsidized fertilizer in models where the vote margin is the only election-related variable included (column iii in tables 4 and 5). The vote margin APE is never statistically significant in these models.
The vote margin appears to mainly affect subsidized fertilizer targeting through its positive interaction effect with the MMD having won the constituency (table 4) . In general, the results in this article are consistent with the MMD having favored core supporter constituencies and districts in its targeting of subsidized fertilizer. Through this targeting strategy, the MMD may have been aiming to reinforce existing political support and coalitions, and to motivate turnout among already persuaded supporters (Cox and McCubbins 1986; Nichter 2008; Dunning and Stokes 2010; Hicken 2011) . Our findings are similar to those of Mason and Ricker-Gilbert (2013) for Malawi, who consider the effects of past district-level election results on households' receipt of subsidized fertilizer. In contrast, Dionne and Horowitz's (2013) individual-level results for Malawi suggest that individuals' partisan leanings did not affect their receipt of subsidized fertilizer vouchers. Our findings differ from those for Ghana and Kenya, which suggest that subsidized fertilizer was targeted to opposition areas (Banful 2011; .
What do our findings suggest about hypothesis 2-that support for the MMD incumbent was increasing in the scale or coverage of the fertilizer subsidy program? We find no empirical support for this hypothesis based on district-level panel data covering the 2006 and 2011 presidential elections. Regardless of the subsidized fertilizer variable used, regardless of additional or different control variables included in the model, and regardless of the estimator used (POLS, CRE-POLS, or CRE fractional response probit), we find no evidence of statistically significant subsidized fertilizer effects on the share or number of votes won by the incumbent. 19 Main results are reported in table 6. Zambian voters seem to have taken to heart PF candidate Michael Sata's 2011 campaign slogan, "Don't kubeba," that is, take what politicians give you but do not let it influence your vote. Our findings differ from Dionne and Horowitz's (2013) result from Malawi that receipt of a subsidized fertilizer voucher in 2009 increased the likelihood that an individual felt "close to" Mutharika's party in 2010. This difference could be due to differences in data, identification strategy, or level of analysis; to programmatic differences between the two countries' fertilizer subsidy programs (e.g., Malawi's program reaches a greater percentage of farmers and at a higher subsidy rate than Zambia's); or to differences in the extent of politicized targeting of the program (Dionne and Horowitz find no evidence of partisan targeting at the individual level).
Although changes in the scale or coverage of Zambia's fertilizer subsidy programs do not appear to have affected the share or number of votes won by the MMD, increases in the amount of maize purchased by the FRA appear to have bolstered support for the MMD (table 6) . For example, on average and other factors being constant, a 1,000 MT increase in FRA maize purchases in the previous marketing year raised the number of votes for the MMD by 194-240 and its percentage of votes by 0.3-0.4 percentage points. Though consistently positive and statistically significant, the electoral rewards for FRA purchases are small in magnitude. For example, a 1% increase in district-level FRA purchases from the mean (i.e., from 6,678 MT to 6,745 MT) would raise the MMD's vote share by approximately 0.02 percentage points, ceteris paribus, and a 100% increase in FRA purchases would raise it by less than two percentage points.
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The results in table 6 also indicate that after controlling for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity using panel data methods, variation in economic conditions within districts does not have a statistically significant effect on voting patterns. Notably, when the models are estimated using provinciallevel economic conditions rather than district-level ones, increases in provincial unemployment, poverty, and income inequality are strongly associated with declines in the MMD's vote share. This may be related to Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier's argument that "the voter must blame (or praise) the ruler While we find no evidence of direct fertilizer subsidy program effects on voting patterns in Zambia, it is possible that these programs have indirect effects on voting patterns through their impacts on economic outcomes or via other pathways. Although the estimated effects of subsidized fertilizer are robust to excluding the vector of economic variables, this alone is insufficient to conclude that there are no indirect effects. Large-scale fertilizer subsidy programs such as Zambia's may have substantial general equilibrium (GE) effects on maize and other food prices, farm wages and employment, poverty levels, downstream linkages with the maize processing sector, and other economic conditions. If these effects occur and some of the benefits accrue to and affect the voting behavior of individuals outside of the district where the subsidized fertilizer was received, we would not detect such effects in our models. 21 Other potential pathways of fertilizer subsidy impacts on voting patterns that we are unable to detect include through the awarding of subsidy program procurement and logistics contracts (some of which may be manipulated to generate funds to fuel the incumbent party's election campaigns) and strategically allocating subsidized fertilizer to individuals with political power who can influence the vote choices of others. A final caveat to our results is that they should not be interpreted as meaning that complete elimination of fertilizer subsidies would not have negative political consequences; it almost certainly would but removal of the program is beyond the range of our data.
These limitations notwithstanding, why might Zambian voters have been unswayed by marginal changes in the scale or coverage of fertilizer subsidy programs? There are several potential reasons. First, although the subsidy program's coverage has increased substantially over time, as of 2010/11, still only 30% of smallholder households received any subsidized fertilizer, and the subsidized fertilizer was concentrated in the hands of a relatively small number of better-off farmers. For example, smallholder households cultivating two or more hectares of land received more than half (55%) of the FISP fertilizer distributed in 2010/11 despite constituting just 27% of the smallholder population (Mason, Jayne, and Mofya-Mukuka 2013) . The less land-endowed masses may have recognized this inequity. Second, misappropriation of inputs by program implementers and late delivery of inputs have plagued FSP and FISP over the years (Mofya-Mukuka 2013) . Third and related to the first two points, previous research suggests that the programs have only modestly raised fertilizer use and maize production among smallholders (by approximately 0.58 kg and 1.88 kg, respectively, per kg of subsidized fertilizer) (MofyaMukuka 2013; Jayne et al. 2015) . Overall, the benefit-cost ratio of FISP is estimated at 0.92 (Jayne et al. 2015) . Given this mediocre performance, it is perhaps not surprising that marginal changes in the scale or coverage of its fertilizer subsidy programs did not significantly affect support for the MMD.
Conclusions and Implications for Research and Policy
This article empirically tested two conventional wisdoms related to the fertilizer subsidy programs that have re-emerged as popular tools among African governments: (a) that government's targeting of subsidized fertilizer favors certain areas based on past voting behavior, and (b) that fertilizer subsidies win votes. Using panel data and official election results from Zambia, and econometric methods that control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and other sources of endogeneity, we find that Zambia's MMD governments systematically favored households in constituencies and districts that it won in the last presidential election. Moreover, households' probability of receiving subsidized fertilizer and the quantity received was increasing in the MMD's margin of victory in their constituency. These findings are consistent with the core supporter model of redistributive politics (Cox and 21 The empirical evidence for such effects is mixed. Evidence for Zambia suggests only small fertilizer subsidy effects on maize prices (e.g., a doubling of the scale of the subsidy program would reduce maize prices by approximately 2-3%; . For Malawi, micro-econometric evidence suggests only small maize price and agricultural wage and employment effects ., Ricker-Gilbert 2014 These findings raise important questions and implications for research and policy. First, given mounting evidence of politicized targeting of fertilizer subsidy programs in sub-Saharan Africa, further research on the efficiency and equity implications of this politicization is needed. To what extent does it undermine the capacity of the programs to achieve their stated objectives (e.g., raising input use, productivity, and incomes)? Second, additional research is also needed on ways to reduce the scope for input subsidy programs to be used for political patronage, if doing so is deemed important by taxpayers and other stakeholders. For example, does making publically available the allocations of subsidized inputs to various geographic areas or to individual beneficiaries make a difference? Finally, Zambian voters appear not to have rewarded the MMD for expanding the scale or coverage of its fertilizer subsidy programs but the performance of these programs has generally been poor (Mason, Jayne, and Mofya-Mukuka 2013) . Might improving the design and implementation of input subsidy programs to better achieve their stated objectives also increase their electoral payoffs? As input subsidy programs in Africa are unlikely to be eliminated or significantly scaled back in the coming years, identifying program improvements that are economic and political win-wins may be the best path forward.
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